In the cosmopolitan city of Barcelona, several of us, including my colleague Alan Behr, gathered for a private fashion industry meeting at the exquisite Hotel El Palace. While sipping tea and sampling fine pastries, we heard brief presentations on important legal developments from around the world.
Owen Tse, a partner at Vivien Chan & Co. in Hong Kong, presented on the New Balance case before the Intermediate Court in the People’s Republic of China. The court ruled in favor of the Chinese company New Barlun, which New Balance had accused of selling infringing footwear. The court relied on the fact that New Barlun had filed the Chinese mark before New Balance had made an attempt. To add insult to injury, the court awarded the equivalent of US $15.8 million to New Barlun, which was subsequently reduced to the equivalent of approximately US $700,000 by the Appeals Court. Owen also reported an interesting fact—“Ivanka Trump” in Chinese was the subject of more than 300 trademark applications in the PRC since 2016.
In addition, the practice of using “shadow companies” to infringe the Chinese translation of well-known brand owner’s trademarks is on the rise in Hong Kong. Infringers promote themselves by claiming they have authorization or license from the shadow companies. Example: Pearl Bay vs. Peony Bay in English and Chinese.
From Amsterdam, Herwin Roerdink of Vondst Advocaten gave a presentation regarding fashion brand owners and European Union data protection regulations. Herwin discussed the issue of smart products, such as socks that collect running data of their wearers and golf shirts that track swings, all in connection with EU privacy regulations. Specifically, a new EU privacy law, GDPR, EU 2016/679, which will become effective on May 25, 2018, imposes heavier regulation and more obligations on data controllers and data processors, whether or not the data is processed in the EU. GDPR also applies to the processing of data of those in the EU by non-EU entities that offer goods and services that monitor behavior in the EU. Non-EU fashion brand owners who target EU customers with monitoring products will therefore be subject to the regulation.
Herwin also explained the differences between the approach of the Dutch data protection authority and the United States Federal Trade Commission regarding the permissibility of WiFi tracking by retailers. Although the Dutch decision was based on Dutch implementation of the EU Privacy Directive, which focuses on whether the processing is necessary to achieve the desired purpose, the FTC decision was based on balancing the concern for customer harm and the legitimate interests of the retailer.
From London, Roland Mallinson of Taylor Wessing updated us on the implications of Brexit to fashion IP, on the assumption that the United Kingdom will not leave the EU before March 2019. Roland predicted that existing European Union Trade Mark (EUTM) registrations will likely continue to be recognized in the UK. He posited that parallel filing in the EU and UK is not imperative now, especially if you are not yet using your mark in the UK. He expressed confidence that there will be some arrangement by which current EUTM trademarks and those being filed now will result in protection in the UK, from the current priority date; however, because nothing is for certain, Roland recommended that strategically key brands continue to file UK applications in parallel with any new EUTM applications. For existing UK and EUTM registrations, it does not automatically follow that a new UK application should be filed now – even for strategically key brands.
The discussion also focused on the practical issue of transferring 900,000 EUTM registrations to the UK system, a process made more complex by the fact that a fair number of the registrations were not filed in English. Some issues, like parallel imports and European design rights, have political sensitivities.
Finally, I made a presentation regarding the important Star Athletica case, which was decided by the US Supreme Court in March 2017. We have previously reported on that development in our blogs on March 22, 2017 and May 5, 2017.
In short, we had a very enjoyable and productive meeting. And as anyone who attends the INTA annual meeting knows, half the pleasure for us was being able to sit down while we networked with friends and colleagues.
Credit: Monica P. McCabe
Thank you to Phillips Nizer law clerk Candace Arrington of our Corporate & Business Law and Intellectual Property Law Practices for providing assistance with the review and preparation of this blog post.
One of the hot topics du jour in the fashion press is the copyright battle in the Supreme Court involving cheerleader uniforms. It poses the question of when a two-dimensional design that is part of a useful article is copyrightable—in this case, designs consisting of color blocks, chevrons, and lines in uniforms for cheerleaders. The Copyright Act provides that a “useful article” is not copyrightable, but it allows for copyright in the “pictorial, graphic and sculptural” features of useful objects as long as those features are “separable” from and can exist independently of the object itself.
Under the statutory definition, you can secure a copyright for a fabric or lace design, but you cannot secure a copyright in a dress made with the fabric or lace. An artist who draws a dress can secure a copyright in the drawing and can prevent someone from using it on greeting cards or wastebaskets, but the artist cannot use the copyright to prevent anyone from actually making the dress depicted in the drawing.
Although the concept of separability is easy to state in the abstract, at times it has been hard to apply in practice. Cheerleader uniforms present a particularly difficult problem. The designs here are not printed on the fabrics used in the uniforms. They are part of the garment’s construction. The placement of the design features—color piping around the neckline and arm holes, lines down the sides in color blocks, chevrons in the center, lines marking the boundaries between blocks of color—results from the contours of the garments. The placement also serves the functional purposes of hiding seams that are sewn on the outside (instead of the inside) of the garments to prevent chafing, strengthening parts of the garments so that they hold their shape, and creating optical illusions that lengthen the torso and slim the waist. The designs also help make the garments recognizable as uniforms and not street clothing.
The challenger, Star Athletica, focuses on those functional considerations and argues that the designs are inherent in the useful objects and do not exist independently. It argues that, if the designs have any function, they are not separable from the uniforms.
The United States and Varsity Brands, the copyright owner, argue that, because the graphic designs can be applied to products other than dresses, they are separable, can exist independently and are therefore copyrightable. The government further argues that the Copyright Office cannot be in the business of determining how any particular two-dimensional design functions in any given context when called upon to determine whether it can indeed exist independently. Under that argument, any two-dimensional design could potentially be deemed independent and separable from the three-dimensional objects to which it is applied.
In a great irony, the case was argued before the Supreme Court on Halloween. Halloween costumes frequently have been the subject of litigation under the particular provisions of the Copyright Act at issue in the case. (In case you are wondering, under current precedent, costumes are generally not copyrightable, but masks generally are.)
Reading the oral argument before the Supreme Court and the briefs, I was struck by the fact that the case is not unlike the famous figure ground optical illusion in which you can simultaneously see either a goblet or the profile of two faces. Star Athletica sees the goblet. If the lines define the goblet, it is the design of a useful object, and Varsity Brands cannot prevent Star from making the goblet. But Varsity Brands and the government see the profile pictures, which are separable, and it would be irrelevant whether they also define a goblet from the perspective of another viewer.
Stanford Law School Professor Mark Lemley, as the lead author of a brief submitted by a number of law professors in support of Star Athletica, attempts to separate the figure from the ground. He argues that copyright could protect the designs, but not the coordination and arrangement (i.e. placement) of the elements of the designs that result from the shape or construction of the garments. In effect, this proposed test would exclude from the protection of copyright those elements of the designs dictated by the needs of making the useful article truly useful.
There are other relevant questions that none of the lower courts in the case considered and which none of the briefs submitted to the Supreme Court addressed: What are the two-dimensional designs that are protected and are those designs copyrightable under more general principles of copyright law? Are they original or are they in the public domain? Is there a merger of the general idea with its expression so that there is nothing that is copyrightable? Are the decorative aspects what copyright law refers to as “scènes à faire” (stock representations implicit in the subject matter, in this case cheerleader uniforms)? Both the trial court and the appellate court expressly said they were not addressing whether the two-dimensional designs were copyrightable and were reserving that question. And the Supreme Court, in accepting the case, refused to consider this question, because it was not ruled on below.
Justice Elena Kagan inquired at argument: What is your design; can someone just add another stripe to avoid infringement? Varsity Brands’ counsel did not address the first part of the question and, in response to the second part, said that merely adding something to a copyrightable design “usually” does not avoid infringement. The response did little to address the Court’s expressed concern for the anti-competitive effect on the market for cheerleader uniforms and markets for other products for which the design has a functional purpose, such as camouflage fabric for military use. Indeed, it is worth noting that Star Athletica made a point of informing the Court that Varsity Brands controls 80% of the U.S. market for cheerleader uniforms.
That may help explain why all of the Supreme Court Justices who asked questions were troubled by the idea of handing Varsity Brands a monopoly over cheerleader uniform designs through the use of its copyright registrations. How they might avoid that result is an open question. Star Athletica offered one alternative that might have a major impact on the fashion industry, particularly on the accessories market, where protection of three-dimensional designs is an on-going concern: Any aspect of the design that is functional in part is not conceptually separable. (Say goodbye to the Kieselstein-Cord belt buckle decision, a ground-breaking case won by this firm and which a number of briefs argued was wrongly decided.) Another alternative, endorsed by the American Intellectual Property Association, is to vacate the decision and instruct the court below to determine first the validity of the copyright in the designs under more general copyright law concepts that would factor into the analysis the use of routine design features in uniforms. Either way, one suspects that Star Athletica’s use of its copyrights to prevent competition in the cheerleader uniform market may be short lived.
Credit: Helene M. Freeman
A case that was decided last year by the New York Supreme Court, Kings County, illustrates the importance of protecting the confidentiality of proprietary supplier and manufacturing sources.
In this case, a wholesale distributor of off-price apparel engaged an employee to assist the distributor in sourcing merchandise from overseas manufacturers. The distributor and employee made a number of trips to a South American country where the distributor sourced merchandise through a business broker who provided introductions to local apparel factories.
After a few years, the employee left the distributor to work for a competitor that began to place orders for merchandise with these same factories through the same broker.
The distributor subsequently brought an action against the employee and the competitor for unfair competition claiming that the identity of the broker and associated factories constituted trade secrets, which the employee misappropriated for his own and the competitor’s benefit.
Under New York law, a former employee may generally solicit a business’s customers, so long as the employee is not bound by a non-compete agreement, does not solicit the customers while still employed by the business and does not rely on customer information that was wrongfully obtained or which constitutes a trade secret. The courts have applied a similar standard when evaluating whether the identity of a company’s suppliers may be treated as a trade secret, often also considering whether the company had exclusive arrangements with those suppliers.
In determining whether information is a trade secret, New York courts frequently apply a six factor analysis:
- the extent to which the information is known outside of the company;
- the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in the business;
- the extent of measures taken by the company to guard the secrecy of the information;
- the value of the information to the company and its competitors;
- the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the information; and
- the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
The court ultimately decided the action in favor of the employee and competitor, determining that the identity of the broker and the associated factories were not trade secrets. The distributor did not establish that the broker or the factories had promised to or did, in fact, sell exclusively to the distributor and did not show that the identities of the broker and the associated factories were confidential. The distributor also failed to provide evidence that it had undertaken great effort in discovering the factories, in establishing a business relationship with the broker or in keeping the identities of the parties secret.
The lesson here is that businesses that depend on key suppliers should not rely on trade secret protection alone to protect these relationships. Instead, they should take steps to identify as proprietary that information which they wish to protect and should enter into appropriately tailored non-compete and non-solicitation agreements with their employees that are designed to prevent them from disclosing or otherwise taking unfair advantage of such information of which they become aware during the course of their employment.
Credit: R. Brian Brodrick
Brian is a partner in Phillips Nizer’s Corporate Law and Securities & Private Placement Practices.
While the Supreme Court’s recent healthcare and marriage equality rulings garnered a lot of attention, there was another decision at the end of the Court’s term that may be more meaningful to the business of fashion – Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, the Spiderman patent litigation. Steven Kimble secured a patent for a Spiderman toy that shot the character’s “webs” from a hand. Marvel, owner of the character, purchased the patent to resolve a claim of patent infringement, promising to pay royalties on sales of the toy.
The popularity of the toy outlived the twenty-year patent term. Under a fifty-year-old Supreme Court decision, the obligation to pay royalties under a contract ends when the patent term expires, even if the agreement contains no termination date. Court decisions have applied the same rule to copyright licenses and assignments.
The Spiderman case called for the Supreme Court to reconsider the rule and permit the continued collection of royalties as provided in the contract. Although conceding that the fifty-year-old case might have been wrongly decided, as a number of courts and commentators have noted, the Court declined the opportunity to overrule it. Instead, it advised that, if the rule is to be changed, it is up to Congress to do so. Spidey is now free to cast his web without writing any more checks.
The decision is a reminder to licensors that patent and copyright rights do not last forever. In contrast, trademarks last as long as they are used and protected and trade secrets last as long as their secrecy is maintained. Joining a license for patents and copyrights with related trademarks or trade secrets can be a good way to maintain royalties after the patents and copyrights have expired. Licensees, on the other hand, should periodically investigate whether they are paying royalties under patents or copyrights that may have expired.
Credit: Helene M. Freeman
The U.S. Copyright Office delivered a Christmas present to the creative industries: The third edition of the Compendium of Copyright Office Practices. Unlike its predecessors, the third edition is not merely a set of instructions to the Copyright Office staff for administering the registration and recordation functions of the Register of Copyrights. The new version is intended to provide guidance to applicants for copyright, as well, setting forth what is and is not copyrightable and identifying who is entitled to claim copyright ownership.
Fabric and jewelry designers will find its lists of non-copyrightable subject matter and its examples of the distinction between copyrightable and non-copyrightable designs instructive. While the Compendium reflects significant judicial decisions, collected in a table of authorities, it also ventures into areas that have been considered unsettled.
This is particularly apparent in the section devoted to the copyright in websites. Insofar as the Register of Copyright is concerned, the format, layout and “look and feel” of a website are not copyrightable; but the content—text, photographs, audio and audio-visual works—are copyrightable. The website creator may have a copyright in the collection or compilation of these materials, consisting of their selection and arrangement, even if it has not created the contents. If the website’s terms of service require a user to convey “exclusive rights” in user generated content, uploading by the user of his or her content to the site will entitle the site to claim ownership of the copyright in the content. But the Copyright Office does not make registration easy. It requires the users who authored the content to be identified by name in the application for registration. If there are too many to name all, the application should list several authors and indicate the number of additional authors and the staff of the Copyright Office may ask for a more complete list to verify that the identification of authors of user-generated content has been maintained by the site owner. And any registration for the content on a website will pertain only to the particular version submitted with the application, so new matter added after registration will not be covered by the prior registration. Although it may be made available for display throughout the world, a website is considered an “unpublished work”, unless downloading or sharing of content is authorized.
The Compendium does not have the force of law and the Copyright Office has frankly stated that it has addressed unsettled areas in the hope that its reasoning will be considered persuasive should the issues be presented in future cases. But the Compendium does control how the Copyright Office will address applications for registration and a review of its provisions will assist applicants for copyright in avoiding common problems that can impede registration. It is readily available on the Copyright Office website, www.copyright.gov, and each chapter can be downloaded or accessed separately as a pdf.
Credit: Helene M. Freeman
Did you hear the one about the man and woman who walk into a bar and say they interned for a luxury fashion company, a magazine conglomerate, a movie studio, a modeling agency, a jewelry designer or the Los Angeles Clippers and say they should have been paid for it?
It’s not a joke. The legal assault on the unpaid internship continues to pose serious issues for unwary employers. More and more unpaid interns (typically, but not always, students or recent graduates) and their attorneys are rejecting the age-old rite of passage/symbiotic relationship that requires them to work long hours and perform varied tasks without pay in exchange for the opportunity to learn the business, make meaningful contacts, pad a short resume and demonstrate the moxie to make big money from future paid employment. Interns and former interns who never before (outwardly) complained about their arrangements are finding clear support from federal and state wage and hour laws requiring payment of minimum wage and applicable overtime premium pay for all the hours they work—just like regular employees—and are filing and participating in lawsuits to get what they believe they are owed. The public interest website ProPublica compiled and updates a chart tracking filing and status of interns’ lawsuits (http://goo.gl/jBYR9U).
I Don’t Want to Pay My Interns…
Okay, and you don’t have to—if your unpaid internship program satisfies all six of the following factors:
- the internship, even though it may include the actual operation of the facilities of the employer, is similar to training that would be given in an educational environment;
- the internship experience is for the benefit of the intern;
- the intern does not displace regular employees and works under close supervision of existing staff;
- the employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of the intern—and indeed, on occasion, its operations may actually be impeded;
- the intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship; and
- the employer and the intern understand in advance that the intern will not be entitled to wages for the time spent during the internship.
If that does not sound like the program in place for your summer (or other) unpaid interns, you should carefully re-evaluate whether you are in compliance with the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and applicable state law. The test creates a very high threshold, but not an impossible one—for example, it may be satisfied where, among other things, an intern receives educational credit for an internship program that extends a classroom educational experience for her or his benefit to provide experience and training in a company setting. However, employers most often fail the test where an intern does work generally performed by paid employees, is left to work independently or does productive work for the company’s benefit (even if it also benefits the intern). In all of those cases, the intern likely will be entitled to payment for his or her services.
I’m Not Going to Pay My Interns…
Okay, but be aware of the potential consequences for misclassifying someone as an unpaid intern, which include all the back wages owed (including overtime for hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek) for three years (under federal law) or more (under some state laws), penalties of 100% or more of the unpaid wages and the obligation of paying not only your own legal fees, but those of the intern who sued you. Additionally, understand that many of these cases are brought as class or collective actions on behalf of other similarly situated interns. When you add to the mix the fact that companies rarely keep accurate working time records for those interns they elect not to pay, it all makes for a potentially very expensive proposition—particularly when weighed against the option of simply paying minimum wages in return for work performed. Given the wealth of resources and advocates for unpaid interns, the time has come for employers to toss out the “that’s the way it has always been around here” mentality and carefully re-evaluate their unpaid internship programs.
Credit: Marc B. Zimmerman
Marc is a partner in Phillips Nizer’s Labor & Employment Law Practice and Litigation Department.